[WSIS CS-Plenary] Revised GFC draft - strategic aspects

[peyer at bfa-ppp.ch]

Hello,

Just a note to support Parminder's point of view about the need for more 
substantial text, than only the UNGA Resolution 57/270 for follow-up...

I have been wondering those last days what this resolution concretely means, if 
only this appears in the WSIS texts, and as far as I understand things , it is 
really a minumum engagement, which should not be sufficient for civil society. 
Beside working to get sentences about "full and effective participation of 
civil society" back into the texts, I think that civil society should also work 
to support concrete wording on international implementation and coordination.

At the last GFC meetings, on the 6th- 8th of september, several governements, 
among which Brazil, but also some others, made statements about the fact that 
they could not be satisfied with a text where no more concrete wording or 
engagement on international coordination remains for implementation. In other 
words they don't think that the UNGA resolution 57/270 is enough. They are not 
satified with §14 c)"The modalities of coordination of implementation 
activities among the UN agencies should be defined by the UN Secretary General 
on the basis of existing practices within the UN system and within the WSIS. 
The experience of, and the activities undertaken by, UN agencies in the WSIS 
process—notably ITU, UNESCO and UNDP—should continue to be used to their 
fullest extent;"

The governements who mentionned their disatisfaction with this sentences said 
for example for Brazil that the UN-secretray-general had to receive guidelines 
and directions from the states to do his coordination work. In other words, he 
stated that this is a political and not just a managment issue!). But also 
other governements, who are maybe less advanced or progessive, mentionned that 
a minimum of follow-up guildelines had to be decided in Tunis. Some positions 
are for example that a + 5 or + 10 process has to be decided upon at Tunis. 

The question I want to raise, is "can we believe" that there will be an 
engagment on follow-up, if only UNGA relolution is mentionned and even if the 
texts on SC "effective" participation are improved? I personnaly don't think 
so... And share the analyse that this is a strategy to have no international 
engagement on implementation, so that all is left upon national governements 
and upon noe-liberal approach - or the market...

I looked at the texts from the UN Summits on sustainable development today. 
Because those Summits have achieved quite a lot and are often quoted as 
examples of open procedures to civil society participation in their follow-up . 
The first conference on sustainable development was in Rio in 1992. After Rio, 
a commission on sustainable development, depending on ECOSOC was established. 
The commission did most of the coordination work for implementation, evaluation 
and policy debate. It encouraged civil society participation (in a quite 
progesist way from what I was told). But where I wanted to get is this: if you 
look at the text from the Rio conference, what was the wording about follow-up 
and implementation? How concrete was it? Well, if you look at the text which 
are dated 1992, the wording is very concrete. 

I copy some parts of the text below, but you can find it also on 
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21toc.htm

So, I really think civil society working on a position to get wording on "how 
this follow-up within UNGA resolution 57/270 should be". And that we will have, 
since tomorrow to discuss what common ground we can find for such a wording. Do 
we want to support a global alliance? Do we need a commission like the CSD? How 
can §14, §34 and 35 be improved? And what do we do if we get nothing...?

Regards
Chantal


Extracts from the Rio Summit Action Plan – Agenda 21 
(1992),http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21toc.htm 

Chapter 38 "International 
institutionnal arrangements" - 


38.6. The institutional structure envisaged below will be based on agreement on 
financial resources and mechanisms, technology transfer, the Rio Declaration 
and Agenda 21. In addition, there has to be an effective link between 
substantive action and financial support, and this requires close and effective 
cooperation and exchange of information between the United Nations system and 
the multilateral financial institutions for the follow-up of Agenda 21 within 
the institutional arrangement.

INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
A. General Assembly
38.9. The General Assembly, as the highest intergovernmental mechanism, is the 
principal policy-making and appraisal organ on matters relating to the follow-
up of the Conference. The Assembly would organize a regular review of the 
implementation of Agenda 21. In fulfilling this task, the Assembly could 
consider the timing, format and organizational aspects of such a review. In 
particular, the Assembly could consider holding a special session not later 
than 1997 for the overall review and appraisal of Agenda 21, with adequate 
preparations at a high level.

B. Economic and Social Council
38.10. The Economic and Social Council, in the context of its role under the 
Charter vis-a-vis the General Assembly and the ongoing restructuring and 
revitalization of the United Nations in the economic, social and related 
fields, would assist the General Assembly by overseeing system-wide 
coordination in the implementation of Agenda 21 and making recommendations in 
this regard. In addition, the Council would undertake the task of directing 
system-wide coordination and integration of environmental and developmental 
aspects of United Nations policies and programmes and would make appropriate 
recommendations to the General Assembly, specialized agencies concerned and 
Member States. Appropriate steps should be taken to obtain regular reports from 
specialized agencies on their plans and programmes related to the 
implementation of Agenda 21, pursuant to Article 64 of the Charter of the 
United Nations. The Economic and Social Council should organize a periodic 
review of the work of the Commission on Sustainable Development envisaged in 
paragraph 38.11, as well as of system-wide activities to integrate environment 
and development, making full use of its high-level and coordination segments.

C. Commission on Sustainable Development
38.11. In order to ensure the effective follow-up of the Conference, as well as 
to enhance international cooperation and rationalize the intergovernmental 
decision-making capacity for the integration of environment and development 
issues and to examine the progress in the implementation of Agenda 21 at the 
national, regional and international levels, a high-level Commission on 
Sustainable Development should be established in accordance with Article 68 of 
the Charter of the United Nations. This Commission would report to the Economic 
and Social Council in the context of the Council's role under the Charter vis--
vis the General Assembly. It would consist of representatives of States elected 
as members with due regard to equitable geographical distribution. 
Representatives of non-member States of the Commission would have observer 
status. The Commission should provide for the active involvement of organs, 
programmes and organizations of the United Nations system, international 
financial institutions and other relevant intergovernmental organizations, and 
encourage the participation of non-governmental organizations, including 
industry and the business and scientific communities. The first meeting of the 
Commission should be convened no later than 1993. The Commission should be 
supported by the secretariat envisaged in paragraph 38.19. Meanwhile the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations is requested to ensure adequate interim 
administrative secretariat arrangements.




Quoting Parminder <Parminder at ITforChange.net>:

> Dear Ralf and Bertrand,
> 
>  
> 
>  Thanks Ralf, for putting forward the different options we have in front  of
> us, and putting it together in a strategic framework – of what is best to
> work on, and achievable. 
> 
>  
> 
> I have a few comments which only build on what have is being discussed here,
> and may be considered in addition to them.
> 
>  
> 
> First, I will clarify that I did not say that all is lost, neither that CS
> SHOULD walk away. But I insist that a lot is certainly being lost -and I
> don’t agree with Ralf’s assertion that this may not be so – and that just a
> 57/270 linked follow up can be as good or even better. I only mean that that
> the first few days at the prepcom are crucial and the CS must be very
> pro-active, conscious that much may be getting lost. 
> 
>  
> 
> On ‘specific follow up’ versus ‘57/270’ Bertrand has anticipated much of my
> response. 57/270 is an add-on and an internal rule-making for UN
> functioning. In that sense it is the very minimum and not a maximum.  Every
> summit is allowed to put in its own follow-up mechanism and these can then
> be coordinated in the 57/270 framework with other follow-ups etc. 
> 
>  
> 
> So, in this context we need to see some special characteristics of WSIS –
> which doesn’t necessarily make it more important than other summits but
> certainly different – I have discussed these issues a few times earlier –
> about issues being cross-cutting, they being evolving, they often being
> paradigm redefining whereby existing mandates of UN agencies can be limiting
> and used by vested interests to block-out policy discussions on emergent IS
> policy issues. For all these reasons, WSIS needs more specific and more
> multi-pronged follow-up mechanisms. And that was also the logic of the
> original draft. 
> 
>  
> 
> The specificity of the needed follow-ups for WSIS need not be limited by
> 57/270. And what would be the political mandate and direction given at WSIS
> is not of the same order as the sanitized bureaucratic implementation, ‘as
> per existing rules’. 57/270 is in any case there, and to re-affirm it at the
> summit doesn’t add much. And if that is being done then as Brazil stated at
> the GFC meeting – this Tunis phase was really not needed. 
> 
>  
> 
> On Ralf’s poser -- >> Why should we push for a
> new playground that is disconnected from the core of the UN>>
> 
>  
> 
> We really are not looking for any forum disconnected form the core of the
> UN. Any follow-up mechanism will still be embedded in the core of the UN. I
> mean, if ITU alternative is what is alluded to by Ralf, I will like to say
> that I was never for a ITU led follow-up, I am fine with follow-up in ECOSOC
> framework – even ICT TF is in that framework – but that doesn’t stop world
> leaders to give political direction on setting up specific follow up
> structures. And give clear direction to UN agencies to get the WSIS
> implementation/ follow up integrated into their activities, rather than
> merely say, they ‘could’ do it. 
> 
>  
> 
> So whatever virtues Ralf mentions about using the WSIS follow up to
> generally improve UN spaces from CS point of view are still available even
> if we go for more well specified follow-up structures.  
> 
>  
> 
> I think we should be clear that while getting the MSP philosophy more and
> more into global policy spaces is important, this is just one of the
> imperatives we fight for. There is the other issue of keeping up effective
> global policy engagements on IS issues among all actors and ensuring
> effective implementation/ follow-up. And the attempt by US and others to
> minimize political commitment to opening such new spaces is a very political
> act that requires a political response

..
> 
>  
> 
> I am laboring these points only to insist that in pursuance of a strategy we
> may not lose the sight of the ‘truth’. Lets be clear on the truth, and still
> follow the best strategy for gaining whatever can be gained through the
> process. 
> 
>  
> 
> So 57/270 can stay and we should still fight for as much clarity on what
> exactly the follow-up mechanism will be – I am even ready to settle for a
> reformed ICT TF like structure in ECOSOC framework with clearer political
> mandate than just being like all other follow-ups. So we need to fight for
> as much as we can gain on this count. Getting a clear political mandate from
> the summit is always better than, for example trusting Annan to do the best.
> I think he is a good man but I am unwilling to leave things to that
.
> 
>  
> 
> And when we speak about also being ready with an possible ‘exit’ option we
> should remember that points ‘11’  and ‘35’ are still not agreed to by the US
> and remain bracketed. US wants complete removal of any mention of follow-up
> etc in any real way. This may be its strategy to take an extreme position
> and then give a few crumbs of concession – but CS need not begin to accept
> the diluting of the follow-up as something logical and acceptable. We may
> have to negotiate and not get what we want, but to begin to ‘understand’ the
> other position, while it helps to develop ours, too much of it can even
> weaken our negotiating strength. 
> 
>  
> 
> And Ralf, I assure you, it is a long way before anyone starts to think you
> have softened too much and become a moderate :-). Your reputation remains
> unsullied. Look forward to seeing you in Geneva.
> 
>  
> 
> Best regards
> 
>  
> 
> Parminder 
> 
> _________________________________________________
> 
> Parminder Jeet Singh
> 
> IT for Change
> 
> Bridging Development Realities and Technological Possibilities 
> 
> 91-80-26654134
> 
>  <http://www.ITforChange.net> www.ITforChange.net 
> 
>   _____  
> 
> From: plenary-admin at wsis-cs.org [mailto:plenary-admin at wsis-cs.org] On Behalf
> Of Bertrand de La Chapelle
> Sent: Sunday, September 18, 2005 12:22 AM
> To: plenary at wsis-cs.org
> Subject: Re: [WSIS CS-Plenary] Revised GFC draft - strategic aspects
> 
>  
> 
> Dear Ralf, 
> 
>  
> 
> Thanks for the analysis; strategic as ever. I cannot but smile in seeing you
> mention your sounding "too moderate" :-) I fully support your remarks. Some
> additional comments, that also respond to Parminder's remarks.   
> 
>  
> 
> 1) It is too early to consider the game lost. There are interesting aspects
> in the parts on implementation that could become really positive if they
> were more committing (like "should" instead of "could",  or "may", etc...).
> In particular, if governments could "pledge to set up multi-stakeholder
> implementation frameworks at the national level" instead of being
> "encouraged" to do it, this could provide a very interesting tool for
> further action at the local level. Same for international organizations that
> "should" facilitate the formation of thematic multi-stakeholder initiatives
> and not only "could". These are only two elements; we will be able to
> discuss others further during the Prepcom. But this session is critical. 
> 
>  
> 
> 2) In the first phase, there was some ambiguity during the preparatory
> process : drafting was done as if the final documents were going to be
> signed by all actors, including civil society. We know what happened : in
> the end it was simply a declaration of governments, because thay wanted it
> and because civil society made an alternative declaration anyway. This time,
> there is no such ambiguity : the final Tunis Declaration will be a
> governmental declaration only . This has two consequences at least : 
> 
> - in the text, governments can/should be forced to make explicit commitments
> binding each of them; in the first example above, the present formulation
> "we encourage governments" is extremely strange : they are the ones signing
> it; so if they think it is a good idea to set up national multi-stakeholder
> implementation frameworks, nothing is preventing them to do it on their own;
> there is no better space to do it. In fact it is their very responsibility
> and no government should be allowed to sign the Declaration without this
> personnal commitment. The present formulation would only be appropriate if
> civil society organizations were also signing the text.  
> 
> - there is a very simple  "exit" strategy/threat : if the final document
> appears too weak in terms of commitment (just reiterating the Geneva
> Documents and saying : this should be implemented the way we always do it in
> the UN), it will be very easy to issue a public statement exposing it and
> denouncing the incredible waste of time and money of the last two years. As
> a matter of fact, Brazil has already used the argument on Sept 6 in the
> public GFC meeting, saying : "if we only say everybody should do it the way
> they have always done it, what was the purpose of the second phase ?" This
> is a very strong argument and one that could get press attention. CS does
> not need to walk away. Indeed, CS is the community willing to move forward
> with actors who do want to accomplish something and not see wasted the
> energy and time devoted to this process in the last four years. Some
> governments might want to join and set upt something more efficient as an
> outcome of this. 
> 
>  
> 
> 3) Tunis is all about implementation and the participation of
> non-governmental actors in it. It is unique. Traditional summits usually
> shelve declarations as soon as they are signed and governments wait five -
> sometimes ten - years before review summits take note that little progress
> has actually been made. Holding a second summit two years only after the
> first one has forced governments to face an issue they usually carafully
> avoid : the implementaion of decisions they have adopted. 
> 
>  
> 
> Of course, a great uncertainty remains on what follow-up mechanisms will be
> put in place - and even on whether there will be any such mechanism at all,
> given the strong objection of the United States. Nevertheless, all
> discussionsin the last two years (particularly in the context of the WGIG)
> point in the direction of a broader acceptance of a "multi-stakeholder"
> approach and the need to include civil society at all levels, national,
> regional and international. This is a progress and an opportunity to set a
> precedent in this respect. This has to be secured and the formulation "full
> and effective" (or any equivalent allowing governments to save face) is
> indeed a key point that should not be dropped. 
> 
>  
> 
> 4) Resolution 57/270 B will not be dropped, you are right. Still, I note
> that this resolution, beyond its incredibly contorted language, should not
> be interpreted the way it is by governments, as a limitation of the
> possibility to establish a real follow-up and implementation framework : 
> 
> - its very origin comes from the fact that (quote) : "after a decade of such
> events (ie summits), progress in implementation has been insufficient and
> therefore the time has come to vigorously pursue effective implementation";
> in other words, one reason for this resolution is the fact that governments
> do not live up to their commitments : do they really want to insist on that
> ? 
> 
> - 57/270 is also directed at the organizations of the UN system, to make
> sure they all take into account the outcomes of various summits, instead of
> letting their recommendations sleep in a drawer as usual; this resolution
> therefore sets a minimum, not a maximum; how could anybody want to prevent
> establishing even more efficient mechanisms ? 
> 
> - for that very reason, it cannot be regarded as preventing any summit to
> put in place more detailed follow-up mechanisms of its own; in fact, the
> very beggining of resolution 57/270 (in its paragraph4) precisely mentions
> the need to remind governments of their obligation to "fulfill their
> commitments regarding the means of implementation contained in the relevant
> paragraphs of the outcomes documents of [each summit]" and even explicitly
> mentions the "Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on sustainable
> Development (Johannesburg)" 
> 
>  
> 
> 5) Finally, in terms of strategy, CS actors present in Geneva next week
> should remember that there is little time, that there are only two issues on
> the table (IG and follow-up). Both are about process and this PrepCom is all
> about drafting : issues outside the scope of those two themes (substantive
> or related to the Tunis Summit itself) should be handled in parallel with
> the negociation process to allow the best use of this limited time.   
> 
>  
> 
> There are other points in your paper that I wanted to address but this is
> enough for the moment I suppose :-)
> 
>  
> 
> Looking forward to seeing you in Geneva. 
> 
>  
> 
> Best
> 
>  
> 
> Bertrand
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> 
> 
>  
> 
> On 9/17/05, Ralf Bendrath <bendrath at zedat.fu-berlin.de> wrote: 
> 
> [Please note that by using 'REPLY', your response goes to the entire list.
> Kindly use individual addresses for responses intended for specific people] 
> 
> Click http://wsis.funredes.org/plenary/ to access automatic translation of
> this message!
> _______________________________________
> 
> Thanks for the compliation, Bertrand - really helpful. 
> 
> BTW: The latest drafts of the Political Chapeau and the Operation Part are
> now online as annexes to the report on the work of the GFC:
> < <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=1867|0>
> http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=1867|0>
> 
> I want to provide some comments on Parminder's comments, and an attempt to
> look at the big picture (especially on creating a new forum vs. the UNGA 
> 57/270 ECOSOC approach) below. I hope it is somehow understandable, I am
> already getting lost in all the dfferent draft versions...
> 
> Parminder wrote:
> 
> > So, instead of heeding opposition to the original changes proposed by 
> > the chair, the draft document is only going from bad to worse.
> I am not totally convinced of this, at least if we look at the
> international / UN level.
> 
> my formatting in ASCII below:
>   <new language> 
>   <--deleted language-->
> 
> If you look at the new para 12:
> "At the national level, based on the WSIS outcomes, we encourage
> governments to set up a national implementation framework with <--full and 
> effective participation--> of civil society and business entities;
> 
> Roughly the same for new para 13c:
> "We consider a multi-stakeholder approach and the <--full and effective-->
> participation in regional WSIS implementation activities by civil society 
> and business entities to be essential."
> 
> This is bad, and we seriuosly have to fight this. We have to insist that
> 
> I support Bertrand's suggestions at the GFC meeting on 6 September
> (from Renata's report: § 10: "We <--acknowledge--> >affirm> that 
> multi-stakeholder participation"; § 12: We <--encourage-> <pledge>
> governments to set up; have the possibility should support...).
> 
> But we at the moment should ask to go back to the original language: 
> §10: "continuous and substantial involvement" instead of "participation".
> 
> But then you also have:
> 
> new para 14c:
> "The modalities of coordination of implementation activities among the UN
> agencies should be defined by the UN Secretary General on the basis of 
> existing practices within the UN system <--[-->and within the WSIS<--]-->.
> The experience of, and the activities undertaken by, UN agencies in the
> WSIS process—notably ITU, UNESCO and UNDP—should continue to be used to 
> their fullest extent."
> 
> The square brackets are gone now! They used to be around "and within
> the WSIS" (referring to "based on existing practices within the UN System").
> 
> and new para 35 (though still in brackets): 
> "<Participation> <--Continuous involvement--> of all stakeholders in the
> policy discussion after Tunis Summit is essential and the modalities of
> such participation should be established."
> 
> At least, "participation" is better than "involvement", or am I getting
> this wrong? We should of course ask for "full and effective" to be added.
> 
> Then, you also have another reference to UNGA 57/270. 
> 
> So: The way I see it after having a long discussion with Chantal last
> night (and I know I am a natural born optimist):
> 
> It seems like Karklins is trying to react to demands from several
> governments to have less mandatory inclusion of observers on the national 
> and regional level, whcih is where implementation has to take place. This
> really is bad for us, but looking at the opposition from Brazil, China and
> other towards the MSP and from the US on the follow-up at all, 
> understandable from Karklin's perspective.
> The problem is: Those fights have to made in the respective countries and
> regions anyway, we can't really decide this in Geneva and then think
> everything will be fine. (Of course, we still have to fight like hell that 
> "full and effective" stays in.)
> 
> But in return, the follow-up on the policy level (which is different than
> implementation) will now be "on the basis of existing practices within the
> UN system and within the WSIS". This is better for us than the previous 
> draft, where the WSIS reference was in brackets.
> 
> In addition, the references to UNGA 57/270 won't go out anymore, I am
> pretty sure. So, what we could push for instead of a new forum is to
> mainstream the existing MSP practices from the WSIS into ECOSOC etc. There 
> are a number of references in the report following 57/270 we can use for
> that (the report is available in html at
> <http://www.wsis-si.org/DOCS/updated-report-13may05-N0534415.pdf >).
> 
> From Chapter VII:
> "In recent years, the Economic and Social Council and its functional
> commissions have significantly intensified the involvement of civil
> society, including non-governmental organizations, foundations, 
> parliamentarians and local authorities, and the private sector. Perhaps
> the most innovative and successful of the Council's multi-stakeholder
> initiatives is the Information and Communication Technology Task Force." 
> 
> (Well, given the weak standing of the UN ICT TF, I know this is not much.
> But we can always refer to the really open discussions and the
> participation of CS representatives as real peers. I know in reality it 
> was a bit different, but officially...).
> 
> In any case, under the current draft, the decision about the follow-up /
> implementation structure will be made by Kofi Annan. I saw his press
> conference in NYC a few days ago on TV, and he spoke quite nicely about 
> the importance of involving civil society better and more effective in the
> UN system.
> 
> Looking at the big picture: ECOSOC is not the greatest place for us, but I
> am not really convinced that it would be better to add new specialized 
> forums here and there to the standards UN framework. That was the whole
> idea of 57/270, and somehow it makes sense to me: Why should we push for a
> new playground that is disconnected from the core of the UN, when instead 
> we have a slight chance to use the WSIS experience for a more meaningful
> (and strategically more relevant) opening up of the core UN framework? Of
> course, for this you need much more patience and other allies. But if 
> anything in this direction can be placed in the Operational Part in the
> end, it is a clear sign that we have some allies among the governments on
> this. If not, we are lost in either case.
> 
> In a way, it is a great chance that the WSIS is the first summit do decide 
> about its follow-up according to the 57/270 report's recommendations. It
> would be much worse if it had been a summit on security policy or the like.
> 
> So, given the fact that none among the governments is enthusiastic about 
> creating a new forum and dropping the 57/270 references, we should instead
> insist on "full and effective and meaningful and whatever" participation
> of CS in the ECOSOC-guided follow-up.
> 
> I totally agree with Parminder on the tactical level: 
> 
> > In the circumstances, if the early few days at prepcom 3 show us that
> > the new implementation text is going to go through, there isn't really
> > much left for CS to associate with this process any further (except for 
> > IG issues) .
> >
> > CS may want to take a decision at this stage on whether it wants to
> > stay in or opt out of the negotiations around the implementation issue.
> > The first task that faces the CS representatives who will attend 
> > prepcom 3 from Monday onwards is to develop a clear CS strategy on this
> > issue.
> >
> > Taking a hard stance at this point on this issue, and lobbying with
> > some more sympathetic government delegations on it, may still be the 
> > only chance even if we are seeking a minimal outcome on some
> > implementation mechanisms, and some real global policy spaces
> > post-WSIS.
> 
> I may sound too moderate in what I wrote above, but those of you who 
> remember that I facilitated the ad-hoc strategy working group in the first
> phase that led to exactly the decision for CS to drop out of the official
> drafting circus will know it is not the case. I am only trying to explore 
> at the moment which avenues are worth exploring and which ones are just a
> waste of energy for us.
> 
> We also should discuss how to use our small threat (the "exit" option) in
> the most effective way. This option is normally most effective when you 
> just threaten to use it. Once you exit, you don't have any impact anymore.
> But of course, we must have a clear understanding of what would be
> acceptable for us at all and where the line towards unacceptable is.
> 
> Best, Ralf
> _______________________________________________
> Plenary mailing list
> Plenary at wsis-cs.org
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> 
>  
> 
> 


--