The Social Programme Of The PKK

[kurdeng at aps.nl]

------------------------ Forwarded from : ats at etext.org ------------------------

Liberation Into The State?
The Social Programme Of The PKK

     As a national liberation movement of the Marxist-Leninist
type, the Kurdistan Workers Party (1) is a seemingly paradoxical
phenomenon: It represents a type of party which loses its
relevance in the whole world, but at the same time the PKK is
plainly successful. Obviously simple characteristics like
"nationalism", "Marxism", etc. don't meet the specific conditions
which the PKK is acting under. That means the problem has a
certain essence of its own and general terms are not necessarily
useful to its description. Here we want to examine important
concepts of the PKK for their concrete use and their political
and social context.  

National Identity And Economy

     The generation which builds up the PKK was born into a
traumatized society, moulded by the experience of 28 Kurdish
uprisings crushed by the Turkish Republic. There was no talk
about the experienced humiliations, but nevertheless fear and
helplessness in the face of state institutions were their visible
result. The strangeness in the face of the state was increased by
the problem of language. Because of missing school education,
especially the women couldn't speak nearly any Turkish and
correspondingly children learned mostly Kurdish in their first
years. When entering elementary school, most children had to
learn a completely new language. While the curriculum glorified
"Turk-ness", the teachers communicated with the pupils by lifting
pictures. Officially, the problem mustn't exist, and so the
education became a mockery. Eventually the pupils finally learned
Ataturk's motto: "How lucky is he who can say 'I'm a Turk!'"
Besides such experiences, which also children made with the
state, the marginalization of big sectors of Kurdish society,
respectively the fear being marginalized, played an important
part. A rapid increase in population and progress of
mechanization of farming made redundant a lot of working power.
Additionally, the state economic policy, concerning both
infrastructure and direct public investment, was fixated almost
completely on the Turkish provinces. A comparison of the gross
national product per capita between the richest Turkish province
Kocaeli- $3650/year - and the Kurdish province Hakkari -
$177/year - demonstrates the differences of wealth. A 50% rate of
illiteracy in Kurdistan demonstrates the worse starting chances
in the education system. Consequently the experiences of cultural
and economic oppression are closely linked for the Kurdish
population. The Turkish state does substantiate this further in
its own kind. Turkish nationalism taught in the schools suggests
a feeling of being taken care of in the term of the nation, like
all nationalisms. This creates a feeling of preferring Turks in
comparison to non-Turks. From the Kurdish point of view this
seems to be completely confirmed. They are not real Turks, and in
fact they live under worse conditions. The PKK considers
Kurdistan a colony of Turkey. (2) As a supplier of raw materials
and agricultural products, as a market for the industrial
products of Turkey, politically without national sovereignty, the
economy of Kurdistan in fact fits into the classic term of a
colony. The existence of social contradictions also within
Kurdish society isn't neglected. But the social question is
subordinated to the national question. This is connected to the
development of the traditional Kurdish society. (3) In connection
with the strengthening of the modern state, of its legal and
administrative apparatus, and changes of the agricultural mode of
production, the former ruling layer of the Kurdish society,
consisting of aghas and sheiks, was robbed of their traditional
functions. But their material privileges didn't vanish. Instead
of being based on the traditional tributes, their wealth is now
founded on state-guaranteed large estates. Thus they became
natural allies of the state. Not only that, they abuse their
position as informers of the Turkish secret service. Since the
beginning of the armed struggle, they have also played a decisive
part in the implementation of the village guard militias. Thus
the land question remains one of the social explosives, which the
Turkish state cannot defuse because it needs the aghas for the
ruling of Kurdistan. The sociologist Ismail Besikci drastically
describes this relationship between large estate ownership and
the state by characterizing the large estate owners as an "agent
class". (5) The PKK normally calls them a "comprador class". 
National struggle and class struggle merge in the disposal of
this feudal class. Hence the PKK considers the major problems of
Kurdish society as being induced from outside. But in contrast
with some purely nationalist movements in Europe, it doesn't
argue that the oppressors in reality would be of foreign origin.
(6) The "manifesto" of the founding party congress captures this
priority of the national question: "The main conflict of the
country is of national quality and the solution of all other
conflicts depends on the solution of this main conflict. Starting
from the non-development of the productive powers, the national
history, language, and culture, to the dominance of the darkness
of the Middle Ages ..." Only after the national democratic
revolution "without interruption the transition to the socialist
revolution" starts. The economy takes shape on the level of the
people's democracy. This system permits "state socialism, the
cooperative system, and private ownership" and is "under
supervision of a central Institute for National Planning,
authorized to give orders". Vague as they are, these formulations
allow different for economic models; even the mixed system of the
Turkish economy of the 1970s could be applied by such terms a
good bid. Also the collapse of real-existing socialism has
resulted in an imprecise criticism of "the illnesses of
bureaucratism" by the PKK, but it hasn't resulted in a new
economic theory. The question arises, whether the PKK is really
fighting for a new economic system, or rather for a new identity
and authority.

Becoming One State

     The position of the PKK concerning an independent state has
to be considered against the background of the later Kurdish
history. Forms of improvements of Kurdish status other than
sovereignty have already existed in parts of Kurdistan for some
time. They have always arisen from a weakness of the respective
national state, and always they were null and void as soon as the
state grew stronger again. This starts with the disregard of
minority rights laid down in the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923 by
the Turkish Republic, and continues in the attempts at autonomy
under Mustafa Barzani in Iraq in the early 1970s, the blighted
hopes after the Iranian Revolution in 1979, and the failed
attempt of a new autonomy in Iraq under Jalal Talabani in 1985.
Also the experience with the so-called UN Protection Zone in
northern Iraq, which is under attack by the neighbouring states
at their pleasure, belongs in this list. In his book "Kurdistan:
Interstate Colony", published in 1990, Ismail Besikci (8)
illustrates another explanation for the Kurdish desire for
sovereignty. In a fictitious dialogue he lets a Kurdish farmer
say: "Sir, one needs an independent state to fight against
another state. We are poor and uneducated people. But the Turkish
state is great and powerful. It has an army. It has planes,
tanks, cannons, and guns. It has the police, the prisons, the
police stations, the schools, the newspapers, the radio, just
about everything. What do we have? Nothing."
     The farmer's answer contains two considerations important
for the development of the struggle of the PKK. First, that the
power of a state doesn't only consist of its armed repression
organs; second, that one may need something like a state to fight
against another state, that an independent state isn't just the
reward of the struggle but could also be the means of it.
Ataturk's state shall be deflected by its own instruments: by the
Kemalist fetish for the nation state. Thus the PKK begins to act
more and more like a state. Also, other resistance movements have
their own flags and ceremonies, but which liberation militia has
ever asked for visa for its own area and has stamped passports?
Among the Kurds exiled in Europe, the PKK has conducted elections
for a Kurdish national parliament. In Kurdistan itself, the PKK
enacts actual laws. Alcohol and gambling are forbidden, so is
watching national television, thus the antennas had to be
dismounted. Lawsuits are not to be taken to the Turkish courts,
but rather to the guerrilla. Service in the Turkish army and the
payment of taxes to the Turkish state are forbidden, Turkish
political party offices are closed, the distribution of
newspapers of the media loyal to the Turkish regime is
interdicted, journalists were ordered to leave, international
media needs permission, comparable to the accreditation of a real
state. If necessary, these prohibitions are enforced. To what
extent they are followed, and what conflicts they are producing,
is hard to judge. Some, like the prohibition of alcohol, have led
to visible changes. An important example for the struggle against
the public service system are the schools. Almost 5,000 Turkish
schools were closed in Kurdistan. In the magazine Berxwedan (9)
this is summed up like this: "The institutions of colonialistic
assimilation were closed." The build-up of the Kurdish state
doesn't take place in liberated zones (10), in which the state
power isn't present at all anymore, but in full view of the
stunned Turkish state. The antennas vanish from the roofs, the
alcohol from the shelves of the shops, the number of lawsuits in
the courts decreases, the frightened teachers leave the schools.
In Ankara, meanwhile, they consider draconian punishments, even
for the dismounting of an antenna. Still, the government has not
realized that the PKK cannot be gotten at by repression.
     So the PKK doesn't come along with a programme for a new
society, but rather with a new state. What the PKK offers as a
programme is only slightly different from positions of competing
Kurdish parties in its time of founding. The programme of the PKK
is little concrete in factual issues and is hardly developed. The
slogans of the PKK don't contain social demands like "Land for
everybody" or "Bread for everybody", but refer to the struggle
for Kurdistan, to the party, its chairman, etc. This form of
socialism, on whose realization they still insist, is an empty
term.
     But where should faith in a programme in Kurdistan come
from? In traditional Kurdish society, one always turned to a
personal authority, not to written law. The Turkish state above
all behaved as a new authority with a rather random use of
violence. In the administrative offices the simple people mainly
feel as being petitioners, dependant on the grace of the
highest-ranking official as possible. Social security still
almost completely depends on the family. The state, whose missing
is bemoaned by Besikci's farmer, and also the party, with its
popular leader Abdullah Ocalan (11), again are just another
authority, but finally one which isn't conceived as hostile, and
at the same time seems to be strong enough to give protection
even against states. (12) This is the main reason for the backing
which the PKK receives from the Kurdish population. It takes up
the experiences of cultural and economic oppression, of
marginalization or threatening marginalization of big sectors of
Kurdish society, and it is the only party which is able to stand
up to Turkish state terrorism. Even without a decided social
programme (13) and on the background of authoritarian structures
within Kurdish society itself, the armed struggle of the PKK
against the oppression of the Kurdish minority is experienced as
a liberating step. Nevertheless, the absence of a concrete social
model leaves a gap which is closed with moralistic attitudes,
similar to real-existing socialism's "socialistic morals" and the
French Revolution's "brotherhood". 

"Developing The New Human Being" (14)

     Instead of a concrete socio-economic programme, the emphasis
on the vanguard role of the PKK and its importance for the
creation of a "new humanity" is appearing again and again in the
publications of the PKK and in the statements of its chair
Ocalan. In this context, the PKK itself suggests a certain
affinity to the Cuban Revolution and to Guevarism. Central
importance is ascribed to the function of a politicized and
organized vanguard already in the "Manifesto" of 1978: "In all
phases of history, consciousness was applied to the peoples and
classes from the outside. A 'minority' torn away from production
sets the theory and tries to make it the theory of the people
from the outside. For the colonial people, a national liberation
movement cannot be achieved without the production of a patriotic
youth and intellectual movement under the leadership of a
conscious and organized 'minority'". (15) It is made quite plain
that this task is due to the PKK as the leading political
organization, the national liberation front formed under its
leadership (the ERNK), and the people's army led by this
political structure (the ARGK). But the PKK isn't content with
the establishment of its vanguard function on the basis of such
considerations on a revolutionary theoretical/strategic level.
What is more, it is its particular concern that a new type of
human being be created and realized in the Kurdish revolution,
led by the PKK, which is able to develop a socialism beyond the
malformations of socialist models tested until now, and which is
able to give a universal importance for the development of
humankind towards socialism, far surpassing the constitution as a
nation, to the Kurdish revolution. This rhetoric obviously aims
at two points, besides just the general strengthening of the
ideological legitimation of the armed liberation struggle of the
PKK. The differentiation from both the discredited real-existing
socialist models of the Soviet type, while emphasizing the
original Kurdish contribution to the socialist idea, and
bourgeois-nationalist tendencies and liberation movements,
labelled "primitive nationalism". The orientation towards
socialist internationalism is held out to the latter. (16)
Consequently, one prominent feature of the definitions of the
socialism of the PKK in the thought of Abdullah Ocalan and others
is the emphasis on subjective elements, such as will, morals, and
idealistic values. "Without doubt, all social developments are
related to the underlying economic developments. Nonetheless the
aspect of morals and will figure large. The most important
aspect, contributing a lot to the realization of socialism, in
our opinion, is the aspect of morals. We consider this aspect as
being more important than the economic aspect (!)" (17)   
Accordingly, the problem of revolutionary practice is posed for
Ocalan as follows: "If we want to create socialism, then in the
first place we have to create the human being, within our own
small cores, who shall build socialism ... We define this as the
task of the practice of the militants. Those who want to take
socialism seriously have the task of how they can educate
themselves to be socialists, how they can organize an intensive
education of their feelings and thoughts ..." (18) Thus a
specific importance is given to the instruction and education of
Kurdish revolutionaries to "a firm personality and an own
identity". The already named sociologist Ismail Besikci is
suggesting an interpretation of the vanguard concept of the PKK
by referring to Frantz Fanon: "Societies and people who don't
stand up against oppression and resign themselves to it are hurt
in the innermost heart. Frantz Fanon makes plain 'that it is very
difficult to organize the people and raise the level of struggle
against the colonial power in such an atmosphere ... When an
activist is firing the first shot against the colonialist and
imperialist state, he is actually killing himself.' According to
Frantz Fanon, the first shot is killing the enslaved, oppressed,
and constantly frightened personality of the human being ... He
will become a human being who has confidence in himself, his
family, his compatriots, and his nation.'" (19) With this
interpretation, Besikci, who certainly emphasises that this
"first shot" also may be an anti-colonial press-product, is
moving closely to the self-definition of the PKK. Abdullah Ocalan
himself has stressed in interviews how difficult it was for him
to overcome his old Kurdish "slave mentality". It becomes evident
that the emphasis on the "new human being" and on the morally
fortified personality in the vanguard concept of the PKK has a
great deal to do with the mobilization of identity creating
resources for the realization of the national liberation struggle
against the Turkish state. For the necessary construction of the
"real fiction" (Detlev Claussen) nation, under the specific
conditions of an extreme force of assimilation and of complete
denial of Kurdish identity by the Kemalist doctrine in the
Turkish part of Kurdistan, from the beginning delineation in the
"interior" appeared as being at least just as necessary as the
one against the "outside" to the PKK. That means the delineation
against all forms of appearance of assimilation and colonization
within Kurdish society, the struggle against Kurdish
collaborators as the concrete expression of the Kurdish slave
mentality. Concerning the delineation against the "outside",
however, it was always emphasized that it is directed at the
Turkish state and not against the Turkish population, who, after
all, are oppressed by the same state. This was wrapped up in the
terminology of the "brotherhood of peoples" in the sense of
proletarian internationalism. Meanwhile, isolated voices in the
surroundings of the PKK warningly concede that this distinction
between anti-colonialism and ethnical demarcation is threatened
of losing its clearness under the pressure of the military
escalation of the conflict. (20)

The Relevance Of The Liberation Struggle Of The PKK For Kurdish
Women

     Perhaps the most far-reaching social transformations for the
Kurdish society brought about by the Kurdish liberation struggle
are the ones regarding the role of women. These transformations
are closely related to the liberation struggle, but cannot be
explained solely by the programme and the position of the PKK
concerning problems of male dominance and the oppression of
women. As relatives of Kurdish fighters and activists, women have
played a decisive role in the broadening of the social base of
the Kurdish liberation struggle. They didn't participate in the
proscription of their children and relatives imprisoned as
"terrorists" demanded by the state, and set out for the public
areas of the towns to intervene at the courts, police stations,
and jails with the help of lawyers and they organized themselves
in relatives groups and human rights associations. The Kurdish
scientist Yayla Monch-Bucak explains this with the example of a
woman who forced an autopsy of her husband, with the help of a
lawyer, who allegedly was "shot while attempting to escape", and
this autopsy proved that torture was the real cause of death. She
exemplifies: "Also such a behaviour is revolutionary for a
Kurdish woman. Because it has to be considered that most women
are illiterates, don't speak the official language, Turkish, and
often have never left their village before." As another example
she also mentions a demonstration of mainly elderly women in
front of a prison, women who had come together when their sons
were on hungerstrike against the conditions in the prison. Not
only the police considered this "un-feminine" behaviour,
according to traditional values outrageous, but also some of the
husbands of the demonstrators got divorced afterwards. Also the
massive entry of women into the ranks of the armed struggle - it
is said that a third of the PKK guerrilla consists of women -
represents a decisive break with the existing family traditions
and has certainly resulted in transformations.
     The liberation of women also figures large in the programme
of the PKK. Abdullah Ocalan has written several papers concerning
the issues of women and the family. In its programmatic
statements, the Kurdish women's association YJWK (Union of
Patriotic Women of Kurdistan) stresses that national liberation
isn't identical with the liberation of women. But it becomes
obvious that the national liberation struggle under the
leadership of the PKK makes up the framework in which also the
more far-reaching social liberation of women is to be considered.
In an article by women of the YJWK (22) this relationship is
exemplified more closely: "It is not quite correct to call this
(the solidarity of women with the prisoners) a women's movement.
Also, the widespread participation of women in the support of the
guerrilla in connection with the fallen martyrs in the recent
years isn't a women's movement by its nature. But such an
upheaval of women within the structures of the struggle, their
open actions against the enemy, inevitably also result in putting
their own problems and the demands of women on the agenda." But
there is the danger "that everything remains within the framework
of the political national liberation movement, that the political
and social identity of women isn't defined really ... from the
female point of view." Definitely we can state that the
transformations of the self-image and behaviour of Kurdish women
achieved by the liberation struggle are not completely tied to
its fate. But the question arises, whether the experiences of
Kurdish women made in the liberation struggle are inroads into
the existing social conditions, which cannot be turned back also
in the case of a failure of the PKK, specifically a roll-back, in
one way or another, against the self-determination of women. 

Conclusions

     The PKK stands for a decided modernization of Kurdish
society. For the case of the removal of Turkish power and the
removal of the oppression of the agha class allied to it, the PKK
promises "the liberation of women, of farmers, of minorities, of
the whole social structure". By building mass organisations for
different social groups, the PKK is giving shape to the
emancipation of the oppressed and is making this emancipation an
important factor of its success. The most visible case is the
example of women. It is significant that this modernization by
emancipation of various social groups is directed against the
Turkish state. After all, it is the Turkish state which until now
has forestalled such a modernization in its fear of uncontrolled
political movements, by its alliance with conservative forces
within Kurdish society, and through the neglect of the
educational system and economic development. On the other hand we
can also clearly identify the tendency to tie up the emancipatory
and potentially divergent forces of society, and by this finally
turn them back again. The obvious neglect of factual issues and
concrete social demands, the vanguard concept etc., are all part
of this. This is met by a way of thinking orientated towards
authority, whose social roots go back deep into history. When
Abdullah Ocalan states that "developments which took centuries in
the history of other nations were made in the last fourteen years
in Kurdistan", he is only partly correct. The old authoritarian
relationships are fought by the PKK, but there is the danger of
creating new ones within the party. 

Footnotes:

(1) Verbatim translation of "Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan", PKK.  

(2) Abdullah Ocalan, "Kurdistan Devriminin Yolu (Manifesto)";
cited from the 5th edition, Cologne (FRG) 1993, p.121ff. Abdullah
Ocalan has been the leader of the PKK since its founding on
27.11.1978. The Manifesto was adopted as the point of view of the
party at the founding party congress. 

(3) The relationship between large estate owners, traditional
society, and state authority is described by Martin von
Bruinessen in his standard work "Agha, Sheik, and State. Politics
and Society of Kurdistan", Berlin (FRG) 1989. 

(4) Originally clan- and tribe-leader and teacher of the
religious orders banned by Ataturk; see footnote (3). 

(5) Ismail Besikci, "Devletlerasi somurge Kurdistan", Istanbul
1990; cited from the German translation of "Kurdistan: Interstate
Colony", Frankfurt/M (FRG), p.113ff. 

(6) This happened, for example, in the former Soviet Union, when
the ruling class was characterized as "verjudet" (ie, under the
influence of a Jewish conspiracy) by such movements. Similarly in
Turkey a propaganda below the official level is spread which
tries to defame the members of the PKK as Armenians or Anatolian
Greeks.  

(7) The Manifesto defends sovereignty as the only correct
solution. However Abdullah Ocalan suggested flexibility in this
question when announcing the unilateral cease-fire in the spring
of 1993.

(8) See Footnote (5).

(9) No. 165, 15.11.1993.

(10) The Turkish state had to evacuate some military bases and
its authority is crumbling regionally. On the other hand the PKK
isn't able to maintain a single firm base within the Turkish
borders.  

(11) Generally called Apo, originating from "ap", meaning "uncle
from the father's side".
 
(12) Already the Kurdish national epos "Mem u Zin", dated from
the 17th century, contains such an idea: "If we had a king ... we
would have been asked for also." Cited from Besikci, see above,
p.222.  

(13) In its initial stage, however, the PKK was strongly engaged
in the organising of militant land occupations. Through this it
gained great sympathy amongst the unemployed rural population.
Today, the land question takes a relative status in contrast to
national liberation. 

(14) Headline of an article in Kurdistan Report, No.52 (FRG),
1992, p.21. 

(15) Manifesto, p.153.

(16) Consequently, central points of criticism of Soviet-Marxist
socialism, besides bureaucratism, are "the loss of morals and the
reduction to materialism" (Ocalan), just as limitless consumerism
is criticized in capitalism. 

(17) Ali Firat, Kurdistan Report, No.55 (FRG), p.26.

(18) Abdullah Ocalan in Kurdistan Report, No.50 (FRG), special
supplement p.X.
 
(19) Besikci 1991, see above, p.57.

(20) See article by Cemil Gundogan in Ozgur Gundem, 28.1.1994;
cited from Freitag, 11.3.1994.

(21) Lecture on a meeting in Freiburg (FRG), Jan. 1992.

(22) N.N. article in Kurdistan Report, No.44 (FRG), 1992, p.18. 

This article is taken from the book "... alles aendert sich die
ganze Zeit. Soziale Bewegung(en) im 'Nahen Osten'"
("...everything changes all the time. Social Movement(s) in the
'Middle East'"), edited by Jorg Spaeter. Published by Verlag
Informationszentrum Dritte Welt, Kronenstrasse 16 HH, 79020
Freiburg, Germany. 

Translation: Someone from SpinnenNetz/ICN Berlin

(With the hope that the translation isn't too bad!)

 ++++ stop the execution of Mumia Abu-Jamal ++++
   ++++ if you agree copy these lines to your sig ++++
     ++++ see http://www.xs4all.nl/~tank/spg-l/sigaction.htm ++++

+++===+++===+++===+++===+++===+++===+++===+++===+++===+++===+++==
Arm The Spirit is an autonomist/anti-imperialist collective based
in Toronto, Canada. Our focus includes a wide variety of
material, including political prisoners, national liberation
struggles, armed communist resistance, anti-fascism, the fight
against patriarchy, and more. We regularly publish our writings,
research, and translation materials in our magazine and bulletins
called Arm The Spirit. For more information, contact:

Arm The Spirit
P.O. Box 6326, Stn. A
Toronto, Ontario
M5W 1P7 Canada

E-mail: ats at etext.org
WWW: gopher://locust.cic.net:70/11/Politics/Arm.The.Spirit
FTP: ftp.etext.org --> /pub/Politics/Arm.The.Spirit
+++===+++===+++===+++===+++===+++===+++===+++===+++===+++===+++== 





----------------------------- End forwarded message --------------------------